Opinion writers in Jordanian newspapers focused on a range of political, economic and regional issues closely tied to the developments unfolding across the region. Their columns examined Jordanian-Syrian relations, the prospect of another wave of global inflation, how the performance of the Jordanian government should be assessed, as well as the future of Iran's relations with Arab countries and the possibility of an Iranian-Gulf meeting amid escalating regional tensions.

The articles by Maher Abu Tair, Ahmad Awad, Salameh Al-Darawsheh, Jamil Al-Nimri and Hamadeh Faraana covered different subjects, but shared a common concern: the impact of regional instability on Jordan, its economy and security, and the future of relations between Arab states and regional powers.

Maher Abu Tair: Al-Safadi's Damascus Visit Goes Beyond Sweida

Columnist Maher Abu Tair focused on Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi's visit to Damascus and his meeting with the Syrian president. Abu Tair said the timing of the visit and the details contained in the official statement raised questions in Amman about the nature of Jordan's role in the Syrian file, particularly in southern Syria and Sweida.

According to Abu Tair, much of the information surrounding the visit remained undisclosed because of the sensitivity of the Syrian file and the complexities of the political and security situation in the south. He linked the latest developments to a Jordanian-Syrian-American roadmap focused primarily on the Sweida issue.

The roadmap, according to the article, was agreed upon during a meeting attended by Safadi, Syrian Foreign Minister and Expatriates Affairs Minister Asaad Al-Shaibani, the US ambassador to Türkiye and US Special Envoy for Syria Thomas Barrack.

Abu Tair said the roadmap's main elements included resolving the Sweida crisis on the basis of preserving Syria's territorial unity and affirming that all Syrians are equal citizens with equal rights and responsibilities. It also called for maintaining stability in southern Syria, reaffirming that Sweida is an integral part of Syria with no future outside the country, and conducting an investigation into the events that took place in the province.

The columnist said Jordan rejects any move toward Sweida's separation from Syria, and argued that the separatist project led by Hikmat Al-Hijri serves Israel's interests and poses a threat to Syria's unity and Jordan's security.

The article also reported that Jordan had attempted to convene a meeting in Amman to discuss the Sweida issue, but that Al-Hijri refused to attend, according to information cited by Abu Tair. The columnist linked that position to what he described as Al-Hijri's continued commitment to a separatist course.

Abu Tair also pointed to what he described as growing public references to Israeli involvement in developments in Sweida, warning that such a trajectory could affect the province's historical social structure.

He connected this position to Jordan's welcome for a deal to resolve the status of the Syrian Democratic Forces, or SDF, and integrate them into Syria's military institutions. In Abu Tair's analysis, Amman is seeking to close off separatist and isolationist paths within Syria and preserve the unity of the Syrian state.

The columnist placed the Israeli factor among the most serious threats facing Syria and its neighbors. He referred to Jordan's rejection of Israeli incursions and attacks on Syrian territory, as well as its calls for an end to Israel's occupation of Syrian territories it has seized.

Safadi's visit to Damascus, however, was not limited to Sweida, Abu Tair argued. It also addressed the development of Jordanian-Syrian relations beyond trade, including energy projects and railway links that could connect the Gulf region with Europe.

The discussions also covered defense and security cooperation, the fight against drugs and smuggling, and other issues that remained outside the official statements and public announcements.

Abu Tair described the developments as evidence that Jordanian-Syrian relations are undergoing a rapid political and economic upgrade at this stage, pointing to preparations for the third session of the Jordanian-Syrian Higher Coordination Council, which is due to meet in Damascus next month.

The session is expected to follow up on the outcomes of the previous meeting held in Amman in April and translate agreements into practical steps in trade, investment, transport, customs, water, energy and other priority sectors.

The columnist placed these developments within the broader context of Jordan's relations with its Arab surroundings, emphasizing the importance of ties with Syria, Iraq and Palestine, as well as the political and security challenges surrounding Jordan on several fronts.

Ahmad Awad: The World Could Face Another Wave of Inflation

Columnist Ahmad Awad turned his attention to the economic consequences of global instability, warning that the world could be heading toward another wave of inflation after years of price increases linked to the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russia-Ukraine war.

Awad linked the emerging risks to military and political developments, particularly the consequences of the US-Israeli war on Iran and the possibility that it could turn into a medium- or long-term war of attrition.

He also pointed to disruptions to energy supplies and shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, the Red Sea and Bab Al-Mandab, as well as the escalation of the war in Ukraine.

Higher energy, transport and insurance costs, he argued, would not remain confined to those sectors. They would gradually feed into the prices of food, goods and services, creating a fresh wave of pressure on consumers and economies.

Awad referred to a warning by the IMF managing director that the world may be more optimistic than it should be about the scale and duration of the energy shock. The resilience of the global economy so far, he argued, does not mean that the risks have disappeared.

The columnist pointed to continued increases in oil, gas and petroleum product prices, while governments are becoming less able to rely on reserves to offset supply shortages.

But for Awad, the central issue is not simply how high inflation might rise. The more important question is who will bear its cost.

Inflation, he argued, redistributes income and wealth within societies. When the prices of food, energy, housing and transportation rise, poorer and middle-income households bear a disproportionate burden because they spend a larger share of their income on basic needs.

Higher-income groups and wealthier households, by contrast, are generally better positioned to absorb price increases. Many also own assets such as property and shares that can increase in value during inflationary periods.

Awad warned that inflation can therefore function as an indirect mechanism for transferring part of the income and wealth of people dependent on wages and fixed incomes toward those who are better able to protect their assets.

New inflationary waves, he argued, could consequently deepen social inequality and economic disparities, particularly because wages usually fail to rise as quickly as prices.

Retirees and people on limited incomes would be among the groups most exposed to the loss of purchasing power, while millions of households could be forced to reduce spending on food, healthcare or education simply to cover essential expenses.

The impact, Awad said, would be even harsher in developing countries that rely heavily on imported energy and food while simultaneously facing high debt burdens and weak social protection systems.

As debt-servicing costs rise, governments have less room to expand social spending precisely when citizens need it most.

Awad also examined the consequences of raising interest rates to combat inflation. Higher rates increase borrowing costs for households and businesses, while weakening investment, economic growth and job creation.

This can leave large sections of society facing several pressures at once: higher prices, lower real wages, more expensive loans and weaker employment prospects.

The columnist also cautioned against a common misunderstanding about falling inflation. A decline in the inflation rate does not mean prices have returned to previous levels. It means prices are still rising, but at a slower pace.

As a result, some economic indicators may improve while households continue to struggle with elevated living costs.

Awad argued that inflation cannot be treated solely as a matter for central banks and conventional monetary policy. It is also a question of social justice and the distribution of income and wealth.

He called for policies that protect real wages, expand social protection, safeguard spending on healthcare and education, and create fairer tax systems.

Salameh Al-Darawsheh: Assessing the Government Should Start With Its Own Programme

Columnist Salameh Al-Darawsheh focused on the performance of Prime Minister Jafar Hassan's government as it approaches its second anniversary and following the government's announcement of its achievements.

Al-Darawsheh framed government accountability around a straightforward principle: performance should be assessed against the programme and commitments the government itself presented, rather than through personal attacks or peripheral issues.

He argued that accountability is a constitutional right and a tool for improving public performance, but that it becomes meaningful when based on facts and measurable objectives.

The columnist posed a series of questions about what the government promised to deliver, what has actually been achieved, what has been delayed and why.

In education, Al-Darawsheh called for an assessment of progress in building new schools, expanding school facilities, phasing out rented buildings and expanding vocational and technical education through the BTEC programme.

He also highlighted the allocation of JD35 million to the University Student Support Fund and JD80 million in direct support for public universities under the 2026 budget, asking whether these allocations have produced the intended impact.

In healthcare, he argued that accountability should cover the digital transformation of the Ministry of Health, the expansion of health centers, the health insurance project, the cancer treatment programme, hospital projects and the rehabilitation of outpatient clinics in the governorates.

He referred to the health digital transformation project funded by the Abu Dhabi Fund for Development with USD100 million. The project includes a virtual hospital, health data exchange and remote healthcare services. Al-Darawsheh questioned how far implementation has progressed.

On the economic front, the columnist placed the major projects of the Economic Modernisation Vision at the center of the assessment, including the National Water Carrier, railways and ports, development of the Risha gas field, renewable energy projects, Amra City and investment and public-private partnership projects.

He noted that the second executive programme includes 392 projects, with expected investment of around JD10 billion through partnerships with the private sector. This, he argued, makes questions about implementation rates, deadlines and the actual economic impact of these projects central to any assessment of the government.

On public finances, Al-Darawsheh said accountability should examine implementation of the budget law, deficit control, spending efficiency, the trajectory of public debt and efforts to increase revenues without placing additional burdens on citizens.

It should also assess compliance with the economic reform programme supported by the International Monetary Fund.

He cited the 2026 budget targets of JD10.196 billion in domestic revenues, a post-grant deficit of approximately JD2.125 billion and a primary deficit before grants of around JD600 million.

He also questioned progress toward the government's target of reducing the debt ratio to below 80% by 2028.

Crisis management is another part of the government's performance test, according to the columnist. Jordan has faced the effects of regional conflict and disruptions to supply chains, energy and trade, making food and energy security, as well as the continuity of markets and services, important measures of government performance.

Al-Darawsheh used a direct example, asking whether fuel products remained available when gas supplies were disrupted.

He also linked government field visits to the governorates with the need to produce tangible improvements in services, accelerate projects and deliver commitments on schedule.

The columnist referred as well to the Central Bank's role in maintaining monetary stability and the stability of the Jordanian dinar exchange rate. He cited foreign reserves of USD28.3795 million at the end of August 2026, while noting the bank's continuing role in liquidity management, containing inflationary pressures and strengthening the economy's ability to withstand external shocks.

For Al-Darawsheh, meaningful accountability should be based on numbers, deadlines, completion rates and the impact on citizens and the economy.

He argued that assessing the government after two years requires comparing its ministerial statement and executive programmes with what has actually been delivered, making accountability more professional and more useful to both the state and citizens.

Jamil Al-Nimri: What Does Iran Want, and What Do the Arabs Want From Iran?

On the regional front, columnist Jamil Al-Nimri examined the future of relations between Iran and Arab states by posing a direct question about what Tehran wants from the Arabs and what the Arabs want from Iran.

Al-Nimri argued that Iran has benefited over the past decades from Arab divisions and the inability of Arab states to confront Israel. In his reading, the rhetoric of opposition to Israel has also helped strengthen the influence of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps inside Iran and expand the influence of Iran's allies across the region.

He said the concept of the "Axis of Resistance" had provided legitimacy and support for armed groups, militias and parallel authorities in four Arab countries.

By contrast, Al-Nimri outlined what he considers the main Arab demands from Iran: that it become a normal and secure neighboring state, abandon the concept of exporting the revolution and cease interference in Arab domestic affairs.

He also called for an end to the role of armed proxies and militias and for their transformation into ordinary political parties operating under national states, constitutions and laws.

Al-Nimri argued that if Iran were to respond to these demands, the regional landscape could change significantly, with states moving toward greater regional cooperation and reducing sectarian divisions.

Such a shift could potentially pave the way for an economic, political and security framework for the wider Middle East.

In his view, this would also allow greater regional and international attention to return to the Israeli occupation and the Palestinian issue, while giving Arab states more room to act on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

The columnist linked a potential change in Iranian policy to the future of the war against Iran, arguing that a regional settlement could allow the Strait of Hormuz to return to normal operations and move the Iranian nuclear issue back into a bilateral or broader international negotiating framework.

He also raised the possibility of reviving the principle of a Middle East free of nuclear weapons, including Israel.

Al-Nimri argued that Iran's interests would be better served by making concessions to Arab states rather than eventually reaching an agreement with the United States under the pressure of military and economic power.

He said the balance of power does not allow the United States to be defeated, arguing that Washington can combine military and economic pressure and increasingly rely on economic tools.

The columnist proposed what he described as a strategic shift Tehran could undertake, based on abandoning the approach pursued by the Revolutionary Guard, which he believes has reached a dead end.

He outlined specific measures in several Arab countries. In Yemen, he called for an end to the Houthi takeover and the rebuilding of a national army under a unity government representing all components of society.

In Iraq, he called for dissolving the Popular Mobilization Forces and armed militias, ending foreign interference and security control, and addressing corruption and the alleged plundering of the country's resources.

In Lebanon, he called for support for placing all weapons under state control and transforming Hezbollah into a normal political party.

Al-Nimri argued that these demands serve, in his view, the interests of the Iranian state and society rather than continued spending on regional influence.

He concluded by criticizing Iranian attacks on Arab and Gulf states, arguing that such actions reflect the Revolutionary Guard's approach and also weaken voices inside Iran calling for a settlement with neighboring Arab states.

Hamadeh Faraana: An Iranian-Gulf Meeting Could Be a Necessity for Both Sides

Columnist Hamadeh Faraana examined reports about a possible Iranian meeting with Gulf Arab states, while stressing that he was not certain about the accuracy of the information.

Faraana said the reports, whether accurate or intended to test reactions, reflected mutual resentment. Each side, he argued, has sought to attribute responsibility for attacks and escalation to the other while portraying its own actions as defensive rather than deliberate aggression.

Regardless of whether the reports are accurate, however, Faraana argued that an Iranian-Gulf meeting is necessary because of the realities binding the two sides together.

Geography is the first factor. Iran and the Gulf states cannot simply remove one another from the equation because they share the same Gulf coastline. Their relations may shift between hostility, tension, reconciliation and cooperation, but geography remains unchanged.

The columnist also pointed to shared security, economic and political interests as another reason for dialogue.

He highlighted the Gulf market as a potential opportunity for Iranian agricultural and other goods, while noting that Iran's ambitions as a powerful regional state often collide with the interests and sovereignty of Gulf countries.

These competing interests, he argued, have produced a persistent state of political tension.

Faraana also linked the need for dialogue to the ongoing war between the United States and Iran, arguing that its continuation is damaging to the Gulf states themselves.

He said the United States entered the conflict under Israeli influence, while Gulf states are directly exposed to the consequences of the fighting. Rising oil prices and higher commodity prices can also affect American consumers.

The columnist also discussed the BRICS meeting held in India on September 10, 2026, attended by Brazil, Russia, China, South Africa, Ethiopia, Egypt, Iran, Indonesia, the United Arab Emirates and India.

He said the meeting sought to curb US dominance and unilateralism in international politics and the global economy, but failed to produce a joint statement because of disagreements, including Iranian-Emirati differences over the US-Iran war and Iranian attacks on the UAE.

According to Faraana, Iran was unable to secure a resolution condemning the US war against it, while the outcome was limited to a statement issued by India that avoided the contentious issues.

Faraana concluded that an Iranian-Gulf meeting, whether genuinely expected or merely promoted by third parties, could be necessary for both sides even if their differences remain unresolved.

At minimum, he argued, such a meeting could create space to prevent further escalation and deterioration in the regional situation.

Domestic Issues and Regional Crises at the Center of Jordanian Opinion

Taken together, the five columns highlight the close connection between Jordan's domestic concerns and the wider regional environment.

Abu Tair focuses on Jordan's position in developments in Syria, while Faraana examines the relationship between Iran and the Gulf states. Al-Nimri looks more broadly at the future of Iranian influence in Arab countries.

Awad approaches the regional crisis from an economic perspective, warning that wars and disruptions to energy supplies and maritime routes could translate directly into higher prices for food, transportation and services, putting additional pressure on living standards.

Al-Darawsheh, meanwhile, turns to the domestic side of the equation, calling for the government's performance to be measured through programmes, figures, completion rates and the impact on citizens rather than through personal assessments.

Despite their different subjects, the articles converge around a broader concern: how Jordan and other Arab states can manage an increasingly unstable regional environment at a time when political and security developments in Syria, Iran and the Gulf are becoming directly linked to energy, trade, markets, public finances and the cost of living.