Jordanian opinion pages on Wednesday addressed a wide range of political, regional and economic issues, including public confidence in Parliament and the future of political modernisation, the ongoing US-Iran conflict and the strategic importance of the Strait of Hormuz, Israel’s approach to the Palestinian Authority, Jordanian-Iraqi relations, and the latest employment figures in Jordan.

Although the writers approached different subjects, their articles shared a broader concern with the impact of political and economic developments on Jordan, as well as the country’s position within a rapidly changing regional environment.

Abu Rumman: Low confidence in Parliament does not mean rejection of political reform

Political writer Mohammad Abu Rumman examined the latest Arab Barometer findings on political attitudes in Jordan, focusing on what he described as a significant contradiction in public sentiment.

Confidence in the government and the prime minister has risen considerably, reaching around 49% for each, while confidence in Parliament remains at only 27%. Abu Rumman noted that the figure has barely changed since the Arab Barometer survey conducted in late 2023. At the same time, 51% of Jordanians said they had no trust at all in the elected legislature.

Abu Rumman argues that these figures should not be interpreted as evidence that Jordanians have lost interest in political modernisation. Instead, he believes the weak level of parliamentary confidence reinforces the need to continue and strengthen the reform process.

The current Parliament, he writes, should not be regarded as the final destination of political modernisation, but rather as an early stage in a process expected to develop over successive electoral cycles. The objective is to improve political and partisan representation and build stronger, more independent parties capable of expressing the interests and political orientations of society.

For Abu Rumman, the real test is therefore not one election, but the credibility and continuity of the reform process itself. He argues that the state must remain committed to gradually increasing partisan representation until political parties and parliamentary blocs become the principal actors in Parliament, eventually paving the way for governments that more closely reflect public preferences.

That process, he says, requires giving political parties the space to function as genuine institutions, develop their programmes and political discourse, and build sustainable social constituencies.

Abu Rumman points to Jordan’s 11th Parliament, elected in 1989, as an example that remains alive in the public memory. Jordanians still circulate clips of its debates and speeches on social media, he notes, with a sense of nostalgia for a period when politics appeared to have a genuine presence under the parliamentary dome and MPs were seen as representatives of identifiable political and ideological currents.

He also challenges the argument that Jordanians are simply uninterested in politics. While only 22% of respondents said they were interested in politics, he considers this a substantial constituency that should not be dismissed.

Jordanian society, Abu Rumman argues, cannot easily be separated from politics given the country’s geopolitical position, the Palestinian issue, its history, and the influence of nationalist, Islamist and leftist political currents.

The challenge, therefore, is not to remove politics from public life, but to organise and institutionalise political engagement.

Political parties, he argues, can play a particularly important role among younger generations by transforming anger and political questions into programmes and policies, while encouraging young people to think in terms of what is politically possible and to engage in public life within the framework of law and the state.

For Abu Rumman, the 27% confidence rating for Parliament is not a death certificate for political modernisation. It is a message that the process needs to continue, with stronger institutions, more independent parties, better representation and a Parliament in which Jordanians once again feel that what happens under its dome matters to them.

Fares Habashneh: Who controls the Strait of Hormuz?

In an article titled “American or Iranian Strait of Hormuz?”, writer Fares Habashneh examines the continuing US-Iran confrontation and its implications for one of the world’s most strategically important waterways.

Habashneh argues that there are still no clear signs of an end to the war or of a negotiated settlement that could move the region beyond the current confrontation.

At the centre of the dispute is the Strait of Hormuz, a crucial route for the transportation of oil and liquefied natural gas.

The writer describes two completely opposing narratives. The US position, he says, is that American naval forces control the strait and that maritime traffic and energy flows have resumed as a result of an American decision. Iran, by contrast, maintains that it still holds significant control over the waterway and that commercial shipping remains restricted, with vessels passing only with Iranian approval.

As the conflict enters its seventh month, Habashneh sees the situation becoming increasingly complicated, with several possible scenarios ranging from a prolonged war to renewed escalation or a return to negotiations.

He notes that regional oil and gas exporters are increasingly concerned about the consequences of a prolonged conflict, including the future of energy exports, ports, investments, commercial facilities and global trade.

The two sides are also assessing the balance of power from fundamentally different perspectives.

Washington, according to Habashneh, believes that economic pressure and sanctions can weaken Tehran and eventually force the Iranian leadership back to the negotiating table. Iran, meanwhile, sees much of the American discourse about control of Hormuz as psychological and political warfare.

Habashneh questions the US narrative by pointing to oil prices. If the strait has genuinely reopened and oil and gas shipments are flowing normally, he asks, why has the price of oil not fallen significantly? And if American forces have secured the waterway, why are US oil inventories continuing to decline?

He also highlights another potential constraint on Washington: military stockpiles.

Iran, he says, is closely monitoring the quantities of American missiles, ammunition, aircraft and air-defence systems being used in the conflict, and is asking whether US manufacturing capacity can replenish those stocks quickly enough.

Every additional day of war, Habashneh argues, increases the military cost for Washington. The issue of American weapons stocks has already emerged as a concern among US military officials, particularly in relation to any further escalation.

Iran therefore still has several strategic cards, including the Strait of Hormuz, maritime traffic, global energy markets, oil prices and the pressure that prolonged warfare could place on US military resources.

Habashneh concludes that renewed mediation efforts are likely to focus on finding a new negotiating formula acceptable to both sides. Ultimately, he argues, Washington and Tehran are asking the same strategic question: which side can bear the cost of the war for longer?

Washington is betting on Iran being weakened by economic pressure, while Tehran believes the United States will eventually pay a significant economic and geopolitical price for continuing the conflict.

Hamada Fraaneh: The Palestinian Authority faces Israeli efforts to eliminate it

Writer Hamada Fraaneh examines the future of the Palestinian Authority in an article titled “The Palestinian Authority on the Road to Israeli Elimination, Not a Settlement.”

Fraaneh argues that recent statements by Israeli Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich and Defence Minister Israel Katz against the Palestinian Authority cannot be explained solely as election-driven political rhetoric ahead of Israel’s next Knesset elections.

He sees the Israeli political arena as dominated by competition between different currents of the far right and religious right, while arguing that the major political camps remain broadly aligned around an expansionist and colonial approach to the Palestinian question.

Despite its weaknesses and the criticism directed at it, Fraaneh considers the Palestinian Authority the legitimate political address of the Palestinian state project, pointing to the international recognition enjoyed by Palestine.

He compares the Authority’s limited territorial control to the Vatican, arguing that geographical size does not necessarily determine political or diplomatic weight.

The central issue, in his view, is that the Palestinian Authority represents an alternative to the Israeli colonial project, regardless of its administrative limitations.

Fraaneh also points to the continued presence of millions of Palestinians across the territories and within Israel, arguing that attempts to establish an exclusively Jewish state over the entire territory face the demographic and political reality of a large Palestinian population that remains attached to its national identity.

He draws comparisons with historical colonial experiences in South Africa, Algeria, Vietnam, Afghanistan and elsewhere, arguing that military power alone does not guarantee the permanent survival of colonial projects.

Fraaneh concludes that Smotrich, Katz, Itamar Ben-Gvir and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu are seeking opportunities and justifications to eliminate the Palestinian Authority because, in his assessment, it represents Palestine as an alternative to and a counterweight against the Israeli colonial project.

Maher Abu Tair: Jordan and Iraq need to protect their relationship

Writer Maher Abu Tair turns to Jordanian-Iraqi relations in an article titled “What We Want from Iraq and What Iraq Wants from Us.”

Abu Tair argues that the relationship between Jordan and Iraq is too strategically important to be allowed to deteriorate because of hostile rhetoric or political currents seeking to pull Iraq away from its Arab surroundings.

Drawing on his own experience, Abu Tair recalls four visits to Iraq, including trips during Saddam Hussein’s rule and later visits following the fall of his regime.

He says he never felt like a stranger in Iraq because of the country’s special place in Jordanian consciousness, rooted in geography and history rather than temporary political circumstances.

However, he expresses concern over what he describes as hostile rhetoric from a limited number of Iraqi figures and groups. Such rhetoric, he argues, does not represent the majority of Iraqis or the Iraqi state.

Abu Tair traces some of the tension back to the period after 2003, when Jordan faced accusations of being sympathetic to Saddam Hussein, followed by the growing influence of Iraq’s relationship with Iran.

He criticises statements suggesting that Iraqi armed groups could move against Jordan, arguing that such rhetoric demonstrates a failure to understand the sensitivity of the border and the wider regional consequences of irresponsible political statements.

The writer also recalls Jordan’s role in hosting millions of Iraqis and in protecting its border with Iraq during years of sectarian violence and armed conflict.

For Abu Tair, the relationship cannot be reduced to oil supplies or economic interests. It is fundamentally connected to regional security, the future of the two societies and the wider geopolitical map of the region.

He therefore delivers two messages.

The first is directed at Jordanian policymakers, urging them to strengthen ties with Iraq and prevent the current signs of alienation from becoming a wider political rupture.

The second is addressed to Iraq, calling on its political leadership to protect its relationship with Jordan and avoid allowing temporary emotions to override strategic interests.

“We love Iraq, we want it as an ally, and we will not abandon it under any circumstances,” Abu Tair writes, adding that Jordan expects the same commitment from Iraq.

Salameh Al-Dra'awi: What lies behind Jordan’s employment figures?

On the economic front, writer Salameh Al-Dra'awi examines Jordan’s employment figures in an article titled “Jobs in Jordan: What Do the Numbers Tell Us?”

Al-Dra'awi highlights the creation of 87,617 net jobs for Jordanians in 2025, describing it as the highest level recorded historically.

But he argues that the headline figure alone does not tell the full story. The more important questions concern the structure of the labour market, the role of the private sector and the groups and regions benefiting from new employment.

Total net employment for Jordanians and non-Jordanians reached 95,122 jobs, down 1.3% from 2024. At the same time, net employment among Jordanians increased by 0.8%, while employment among non-Jordanians fell by 21.1%.

Jordanians accounted for around 91% of newly created jobs. Al-Dra'awi cautions, however, against immediately interpreting this as evidence of a systematic replacement of foreign workers with Jordanians, arguing that more detailed data is needed on the occupations and economic sectors where the new jobs were created.

The private sector has become the main engine of job creation, accounting for 73.1% of net new jobs during the second half of the year.

That trend is particularly significant, he argues, because the public sector has limited capacity to absorb the growing number of new entrants into the labour market.

But Al-Dra'awi stresses that the issue is not simply how many jobs the economy creates. During the second half of the year, 84,876 people found employment, while 38,157 left their jobs, producing a net increase of 46,719 jobs.

Working conditions were a major factor behind departures. Conditions including the distance to the workplace and long working hours accounted for 46.8% of the reasons cited for leaving employment.

This means, he argues, that the labour market challenge is no longer simply about creating jobs. It is also about creating jobs that people can realistically retain.

There are also significant age and geographic disparities. People aged 20 to 29 accounted for 78.8% of net new jobs in the second half of the year, while those aged 40 and above recorded a net loss of 3,676 jobs.

Amman accounted for 39.6% of the new jobs, raising questions about the geographical distribution of investment, economic activity and employment opportunities across Jordan’s governorates.

Al-Dra'awi argues that the next stage must therefore go beyond measuring success by the number of jobs created. The key questions are where those jobs are created, who benefits from them, how long they last and why workers leave them.

He concludes that the 2025 figures offer positive signs, particularly in terms of employment among Jordanians and the growing role of the private sector. But they also set a more demanding benchmark for the coming period: turning job creation into a sustainable process that expands opportunities across governorates and age groups, improves job retention and ultimately has a clearer impact on unemployment and household incomes.

A broad picture of Jordanian concerns

Taken together, the five opinion pieces offer a broad snapshot of the issues occupying Jordanian public debate.

Abu Rumman focuses on the credibility of political modernisation and the challenge of rebuilding trust in Parliament. Habashneh examines the wider consequences of the US-Iran conflict and the strategic struggle over the Strait of Hormuz. Fraaneh warns of what he sees as an Israeli drive to dismantle the Palestinian Authority. Abu Tair argues for protecting Jordan’s strategic relationship with Iraq, while Al-Dra'awi looks beneath the employment figures to examine the quality, distribution and sustainability of jobs.

The articles therefore move beyond the immediate headlines and numbers, addressing deeper questions about political representation, regional security, the future of the Palestinian cause, relations with neighbouring countries and the Jordanian economy’s ability to generate stable and geographically balanced employment.

The common thread is a concern with what comes next, and with whether existing political and economic institutions are capable of absorbing the pressures created by a rapidly changing regional environment.