Over the past several years, there has been little mystery surrounding the source of most drug smuggling attempts targeting Jordan from Syria. The locations, individuals, and networks involved have largely been known to Jordanian authorities.

The state has repeatedly spoken about networks operating in southern Syria, particularly in the rural areas of Sweida. The Jordanian Armed Forces have not only effectively intercepted infiltration attempts but have also carried out strikes against sites linked to the production, storage, and trafficking of narcotics deep inside southern Syria.

A few days ago, the Jordanian Armed Forces foiled a smuggling attempt using small guided balloons, one of the newer methods adopted by traffickers alongside drones. Yet a question has become more pressing than ever: if the sender is known, who is the receiver?

Every smuggling operation, regardless of its nature, requires two sides: a party that sends and a party that receives. Shipments containing millions of pills or large quantities of narcotics do not move by chance. They cannot cross borders and simply disappear. Someone is waiting for them, someone is financing them, someone is coordinating their movement, and someone is arranging their storage, redistribution, or onward delivery.

The security successes along the border deserve recognition. Jordan is not confronting isolated individuals, but rather a cross-border criminal economy, one that previously operated under official protection during the rule of the Assad regime. This economy has money, recruitment capabilities, communication networks, and the ability to constantly search for new vulnerabilities. If attention remains focused solely on the border, the networks operating behind these attempts will continue to regenerate and adapt.

Although the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime dealt severe blows to the Captagon economy that flourished during the years of war, it did not mean the end of this industry.

The new Syrian authorities, backed by extensive security operations, have announced the dismantling of at least 15 production laboratories and 13 storage sites since late 2024. They also seized more than 200 million Captagon pills during the first eight months of 2025, a figure more than twenty times higher than the amount confiscated in 2024.

Nevertheless, international reports indicate that production and trafficking networks have not disappeared. Instead, they have reorganized themselves, taking advantage of remnants of the old logistical infrastructure and areas such as villages in Sweida that continue to suffer from limited security control. This suggests that dismantling factories did not mark the end of the Captagon empire.

Several international reports have described Jordan as a key transit route for Captagon shipments heading toward Gulf markets. This means the entire chain begins in production areas and does not end at the border fence. It passes through multiple layers of transportation, financing, and coordination. Striking the first link is important, but ignoring the final link leaves the fight incomplete.

Do we know the scale of the local networks connected to this trade? Are they being pursued with the same intensity as the military and security operations along the border? Will we see publicly announced results exposing the major figures behind these networks, or will most cases continue to end with couriers, small-scale brokers, and users?

From another perspective, the fight against narcotics is not only a security battle. A major part of it is also a financial battle. The money financing these shipments must move through channels, and the profits must eventually find their way into bank accounts, investments, or commercial fronts. This is where financial tracking, network analysis, and intelligence cooperation become tools as important as aircraft, patrols, and border barriers.

Statistics in Jordan show that the drug threat remains a security and social challenge, despite declines in some indicators. According to the annual statistical report of the Public Security Directorate, the total number of drug-related crimes fell in 2025 to 22,031 cases, compared with 25,260 cases in 2024, representing a decrease of 12.78 percent.

Drug trafficking cases also declined by 18.69 percent, dropping from 7,762 cases to 6,311 cases. Meanwhile, possession and drug use cases decreased by 10.16 percent to 15,720 cases. However, they still account for more than 71 percent of all recorded drug cases, indicating that domestic demand remains a parallel challenge alongside efforts to combat cross-border trafficking.

Jordan has demonstrated its ability to protect its borders, and there is little dispute about that. But the next phase may require asking a different question. Not only where did the shipment come from, but where was it going? Who was waiting for it? And who was going to collect the profits?

Finding answers to these questions could be the step that shifts the battle from defending borders to dismantling the entire network. When the receiving side collapses, the sender, regardless of its capabilities, is left without a market, without a partner, and without a route.