Prof. Ayman Halaseh

Director, Information and Research Center – King Hussein Foundation (IRCKHF)

On 4 August 2026, Jordan’s House of Representatives passed the draft law amending the Real Property Law after a contentious parliamentary debate over the decision to include railways within the statutory definition of a “road.” At first sight, the amendment may appear to be a technical change confined to the definitions provision. Its legal consequences, however, are far more significant: land expropriated for railway projects would become subject to the same rules applicable to roads, including the possibility of taking up to one quarter of a property without compensation.

The legislature did not need to amend the uncompensated quarter rule itself in order to achieve this result. By simply expanding the definition of “road” to include railways, Article 192 of Real Property Law No. 13 of 2019 becomes applicable to railway projects. That provision permits the expropriation, without compensation, of up to one quarter of a property for the construction or widening of a road.

The amendment therefore raises a question that goes well beyond the technical distinction between a road and a railway: how can one quarter of privately owned land be taken without compensation when Article 11 of the Jordanian Constitution provides that “no property of any person shall be expropriated except for public benefit and in consideration of just compensation as prescribed by law”? Can an assumed increase in the value of the remaining property legitimately substitute for the constitutional guarantee of just compensation?

One Quarter of the Property Without Compensation

Article 192 of the Real Property Law provides that where land is expropriated for the construction or widening of a road, no compensation is payable for an area not exceeding one quarter of the property. Compensation is due only for the portion exceeding that threshold. The quarter is calculated on the basis of the area of the property before the first uncompensated expropriation affecting it, regardless of any subsequent transfer of ownership or subdivision.

This mechanism is commonly referred to in Jordan as the “legal quarter” (al-rubʿ al-qānūnī) and, in some comparative legislation and practice, as the “free quarter” (al-rubʿ al-majjānī). For present purposes, it is more accurately described as the uncompensated quarter rule, because that expression reflects its actual legal effect.

The owner does not voluntarily surrender the land. Rather, ownership of part of the property is permanently taken through the State’s power of expropriation without any monetary compensation. In substantive terms, this is expropriation in the fullest sense: a compulsory transfer of ownership for a public purpose. The only distinction from ordinary expropriation is that the law relieves the expropriating authority of the obligation to compensate the owner for the portion not exceeding one quarter of the property.

An Inherited Rule, Not a Legal Necessity

The uncompensated quarter rule is neither a universal principle of expropriation law nor an indispensable requirement for roads or infrastructure projects. It appears instead to form part of a shared legislative legacy that developed, in different forms, in several countries of the Levant, including Jordan, Syria and Lebanon. Similar rules were also known in land and expropriation legislation historically applied in Palestine.

Historical and legal scholarship points to earlier roots in Ottoman legislation governing roads, buildings and urban planning, followed by related legal developments during the Mandate and post-independence periods.

The historical persistence of the rule, however, does not place it beyond constitutional scrutiny. A provision does not become constitutionally sound merely because it has existed for decades or has been carried from one legislative framework into another. Longevity alone cannot justify retaining the rule, much less extending its reach.

“Betterment” as Presumed Compensation

The conventional justification for the uncompensated quarter rule may be understood through the concept of betterment. The assumption is that opening a new road or widening an existing one may increase the value of the remaining property by providing road frontage, improving access, expanding development possibilities, or enhancing its commercial potential. On this view, the portion taken without compensation represents the landowner’s contribution to the cost of a project that has conferred a specific economic benefit on the remaining land.

The idea of taking betterment into account is not foreign to expropriation or planning law. Legal systems may impose betterment levies on properties whose value rises because of public infrastructure, and an actual increase in the value of the remaining land may also be taken into account when compensation is assessed.

The difficulty lies elsewhere. There is a fundamental distinction between measuring actual betterment and presuming betterment in advance.

The uncompensated quarter rule does not require proof that the property has in fact increased in value. Nor does it quantify the increase or compare it with the value of the land taken. Instead, it converts the possibility of betterment into a general presumption and, in effect, treats that assumed benefit as equivalent to as much as 25 per cent of the property.

That assumption may prove entirely inaccurate in a particular case. A road may pass through the property in a way that provides no practical benefit to the owner. It may take the most valuable section of the land, divide the property in a manner that impairs its use, or require the removal of buildings and other structures. Planning restrictions, setback requirements, traffic, pollution and noise may even reduce the value of the remaining land rather than increase it.

Even where betterment does occur, its value may be far lower than the value of the land expropriated. Yet the rule does not permit the owner to demonstrate either that no increase occurred or that the increase was disproportionate to the loss sustained.

Betterment can therefore operate as a legitimate component of just compensation only when it is real, specific to the property, capable of objective valuation and proportionate to the value of the land taken.

Who Should Bear the Cost of a Public Project?

The uncompensated quarter rule also raises a broader question about the distribution of public burdens. A road or railway is built to serve the wider public and the national economy. As a matter of principle, the financial burden of such a project should therefore be borne through public resources rather than imposed disproportionately on the relatively small number of owners whose land happens to fall within its route.

A neighbouring property may gain substantial value from the same project without losing any land at all, while the owner whose property lies directly on the route may lose up to one quarter of the land without compensation. Others may benefit from the project while one owner bears an exceptional and individual loss.

Seen from this perspective, the issue concerns not only property rights but also equality in the distribution of public burdens. The pursuit of a public benefit should not result in one individual bearing a disproportionate share of the cost of a project from which society as a whole benefits.

A Railway Is Not a Road

Even if the assumption of betterment can be defended in some cases involving roads, it becomes considerably more difficult to justify when applied to railways.

A public road generally provides access to adjoining properties and may create new road frontages. A railway, by contrast, ordinarily gives the owner no direct means of access to the line. The owner cannot use the railway from the property in the same way he or she can access a public road.

A railway corridor may instead divide a property, separate its different parts, require fencing or safety buffers, restrict crossing, construction and land use, and expose surrounding land to noise, vibration and safety risks. The economic effect may therefore be negative rather than beneficial.

These concerns featured prominently in the parliamentary debate. Some MPs argued that railways differ fundamentally from roads in their impact on private property and called for railways to be defined separately and for compensation to be paid for the full area expropriated for their construction.

The Government and the House Legal Committee defended the amendment on the ground that it would harmonise the legal rules applicable to transport infrastructure. They stressed that compensation would remain payable for any area exceeding the uncompensated quarter and argued that service roads alongside railway lines could increase the value of nearby properties.

Officials also stated that approximately 70 per cent of certain anticipated railway routes would cross State-owned land and that harmonising expropriation rules would reduce infrastructure costs and accelerate project implementation.

These arguments, however, do not resolve the central issue. The question is not whether the State may expropriate land for railway infrastructure, nor whether such infrastructure is economically important. The real question is whether part of privately owned property may be taken without compensation.

The presence of a service road does not establish that every affected property will enjoy meaningful access to it, nor does it demonstrate that the increase in the value of the remaining property will equal the value of the quarter taken. Similarly, the fact that much of a railway route may pass through State-owned land cannot justify withholding compensation from private owners affected by the remainder of the route. Constitutional protection does not depend on how many people are affected.

A Serious Constitutional Question

Article 11 of the Jordanian Constitution establishes two cumulative requirements for lawful expropriation: a public benefit and just compensation. Satisfaction of the first does not dispense with the second.

The phrase “as prescribed by law” should not be understood as giving the legislature authority to eliminate compensation altogether. It permits the legislature to regulate expropriation procedures and the manner in which compensation is assessed and paid. It should not be interpreted as allowing legislation to strip the constitutional guarantee of its substance.

The uncompensated quarter rule therefore raises a serious constitutional question. It does more than regulate the amount of compensation. It predetermines that no compensation will be paid for an area that may constitute up to 25 per cent of the property, regardless of its market value, the damage suffered by the owner or the degree of betterment, if any, enjoyed by the remaining land. Jordanian legal scholarship has likewise called for reconsideration of the uncompensated quarter rule and its compatibility with Article 11 of the Constitution.

One possible response is that the increase in the value of the remaining land itself amounts to the constitutionally required compensation. That argument, however, is persuasive only where the betterment has actually occurred and its value has been assessed in the individual case.

A general presumption that betterment has occurred, combined with the owner’s inability to demonstrate otherwise, transforms just compensation from an individually enforceable constitutional guarantee into an abstract legislative assumption.

Nor does just compensation require the positive effects of a public project to be ignored. A specific and direct increase in the value of the remaining land may legitimately be taken into account when determining compensation. But such an assessment should rest on objective technical evidence and remain subject to judicial review. It should not result from a fixed formula that assumes, in every case, that betterment equals one quarter of the property.

A Definitions Clause with Substantive Consequences

The amendment is also significant because of the legislative technique through which this result was achieved.

Rather than expressly amending Article 192 and openly debating whether the uncompensated quarter rule should apply to railway expropriations, the same outcome was reached by expanding the statutory definition of “road.”

This illustrates why definitions clauses are not always legally neutral. A definition may determine the scope of substantive provisions that directly affect protected rights. Once a railway is legally classified as a road, the exceptional rules applicable to roads—including uncompensated expropriation—extend to railways automatically.

The key question was therefore not whether a railway forms part of the transport network. It plainly does. The relevant question was whether the effect of a railway on private property is sufficiently similar to that of a road to justify applying the same exception to the constitutional principle of compensation.

The amendment should also have been accompanied by a publicly available impact assessment addressing the number and size of privately owned properties likely to be affected, the cost of compensating their owners, the expected impact of railway construction on the value of the remaining land, and alternative mechanisms for financing expropriation.

Reducing the financial burden on the Treasury does not eliminate the cost. It may merely transfer that cost from the State to individual landowners.

A Rapid Shift That Deserves Explanation

The House of Representatives began debating the draft law on 28 July 2026 amid clear objections to including railways within the definition of a road. It continued approving the bill during its sittings of 2, 3 and 4 August and ultimately passed the draft law by majority vote.

There is nothing inherently objectionable about MPs reconsidering their positions when new evidence or arguments emerge. The speed of the shift, however, raises legitimate questions about what information was presented to Parliament and whether that information was sufficiently debated and made available to the public.

Was Parliament presented with any study demonstrating that railway lines increase the value of the properties through which they pass? Will service roads provide effective access to every affected plot? Was the potential betterment compared with the value of the uncompensated quarter? And what financial burden would the implementing authority have borne had compensation been paid for the entire area expropriated?

In the absence of publicly available answers to these questions, it remains legitimate to ask whether the amendment followed a comprehensive legal and economic assessment, or whether its primary effect is to reduce the cost of railway projects by transferring part of that cost to private landowners.

Review the Rule Rather Than Expand It

The controversy surrounding railways should have provided an opportunity to reconsider the uncompensated quarter rule itself rather than extend its application.

The legislature would have been better advised to reassess the compatibility of Article 192 with Article 11 of the Constitution and with broader principles of fairness and equality in the distribution of public burdens.

A more constitutionally coherent approach would be to compensate owners for the full area expropriated while allowing any real and specific betterment of the remaining property to be taken into account. Such betterment should be determined through independent technical assessment, and owners should retain the right to challenge that assessment before the courts.

It is equally important to distinguish between general betterment, from which an entire area or community benefits, and specific betterment, which directly enhances a particular property. A general public benefit enjoyed by society should not be deducted from the compensation due to the individual whose land has been taken. Nor should a hypothetical increase in value be treated as compensation in the absence of evidence.

Where appropriate, betterment levies may provide a fairer alternative. They can distribute part of the cost of infrastructure among those properties that can be shown to have increased in value as a result of the project, rather than concentrating the burden on the individual owner whose land happens to lie along the route.

A national railway network may well be an economic and developmental necessity. The State unquestionably has the authority to expropriate land needed for such projects where a genuine public benefit exists. But the importance of the project cannot, by itself, justify weakening the constitutional protection of private property.

Public benefit and individual rights are not mutually exclusive. The constitutional task is to reconcile them fairly.

Ultimately, the problem is not that railways are treated as part of Jordan’s transport system. It is that a change in a statutory definition may become the mechanism through which up to one quarter of a person’s land is taken without compensation.

The amendment has exposed the fragility of the assumptions underlying the uncompensated quarter rule: that every infrastructure project improves the affected property, that the value of that improvement is equivalent to one quarter of the land, and that this presumed benefit is sufficient to replace just compensation.

What Jordan needs is not an expansion of uncompensated expropriation from roads to railways, but a shift from presumed betterment to demonstrated betterment, from an automatic exemption from compensation to just compensation based on objective assessment and subject to judicial review, and from placing the cost of public benefit on individual property owners to distributing that cost fairly across society in accordance with the Constitution.

1. ^

   Zeynep Çelik, “Regulation of Urban Space in the Ottoman State: The Case of Istanbul (1820–1900),” Megaron 11, no. 1 (2016): 1 - 14.

2. ^

   Mamdouh Mohammad Mahmoud Al-Sarayreh, “Justice of Compensation for the Expropriation of Real Property for the Purpose of Opening Roads under Jordanian Law: A Comparative Study,” Jordanian Journal of Law and Political Science 17, no. 4 (2025).

    

3. ^

   French Conseil d’État, Couitéas, November 30, 1923; European Court of Human Rights, Sporrong and Lönnroth v. Sweden, September 23, 1982, paras. 69–73; European Court of Human Rights, Kostov and Others v. Bulgaria, May 14, 2020.

4. ^

   Nevin Ali Al-Rawashdeh, “Just Compensation for Expropriation under Jordanian Real Property Law No. 13 of 2019,” master’s thesis, Al al-Bayt University, 2022.