Aaron Magid left a less headline-grabbing question unanswered, one that is far more important to the kingdom’s future: “How is King Abdullah II trying to preserve the stability of a country born in one of the most volatile regions of the world?”

The question Aaron Magid chose as the title of his Foreign Policy article, “Where Is King Abdullah?”, is journalistically catchy, but it does more to distort Jordan’s reality than explain it.

The question that actually needs answering is what King Abdullah II is trying to do in a country hemmed in by an exceptionally harsh geopolitical environment, at a time when security, economic, and political pressures are piling up, layer upon layer, placing a heavy burden on Jordan.

Jordan is hardly a distant observer of what is happening around it. The West Bank is changing before its eyes, settlements are expanding, and settler attacks are escalating. Any push toward displacing Palestinians or dismantling the Palestinian Authority would expose the kingdom to direct and potentially profound consequences.

To the north, Syria has yet to become the stable neighbor Amman had hoped for. At the same time, Israel’s military incursion into southern Syria is adding another layer of risk along a border that has already forced Jordan to absorb the consequences of years of war, from armed groups to drug and weapons smuggling.

The developments are moving in roughly the same direction, even if they unfold in different arenas. The longer instability persists around Jordan, the greater its cost becomes inside the country. The kingdom finds itself at a complicated crossroads, surrounded by regional challenges that leave little room for complacency.

These are not simply separate crises. They form an interconnected web of security, economic, and social pressures that directly affect Jordan’s internal security and stability, while imposing costs over which the country has only limited control.

From volatile borders to the burden of hosting refugees, and from rising energy costs to mounting public debt, the larger picture is clear: what happens around Jordan has a powerful impact on what happens inside it.

For Jordan, the West Bank is not simply a Palestinian issue on the other side of the border. It is a highly sensitive matter for Jordanian national security and for the kingdom’s social and political fabric. Any fundamental change in the West Bank could confront Amman with choices it never wanted to make in the first place.

Syria, meanwhile, is becoming an arena of Israeli, Turkish, and wider regional competition. That means Jordan will continue to devote part of its political and security resources to managing risks rather than investing those resources in economic growth.

Magid left out a less provocative question, but one that is far more important to the kingdom’s future: How is Abdullah II trying to preserve the stability of a country that was born in one of the world’s most turbulent regions, while the rules of the region are changing around him and the margin for economic and political error grows narrower every year?

The economy is where this equation becomes particularly harsh. In a previous interview with U.S. media, King Abdullah II said that what kept him awake at night more than anything else was the high rate of unemployment among Jordanians.

Jordan is not experiencing an economic collapse, and that distinction matters. The International Monetary Fund expects real GDP growth of about 2.7% in 2026, following 2.8% growth in 2025, while inflation remains low and monetary and fiscal stability continues. The IMF has also noted that the Jordanian economy has demonstrated resilience in absorbing the shocks generated by regional wars.

But unemployment among Jordanians remains above 21%, and it has stayed elevated for years. The numbers are even more severe among young people. In an earlier assessment of the country’s IMF program, youth unemployment was estimated at around 51%.

A young person who graduates from college and cannot find a job for years does not look at a 2.7% growth rate the way a finance ministry or international institution does. To him, an economy growing at 2.7% may look like an economy that is barely moving. When that experience is repeated across a large segment of society, it changes the way people relate to the state, to their own future, and even to the idea of reform itself.

That is why the search for new investment opportunities has become more urgent than ever. Jordan needs companies that produce, export, and create jobs, investments that leave a visible mark on the labor market rather than numbers announced at conferences and then disappearing into follow-up reports.

This is where King Abdullah II’s recent visit to China deserves to be viewed differently.

The visit, which took place from August 18 to 24, was not simply a public-relations exercise. The king was accompanied by an economic delegation and met with Chinese officials and major companies. Discussions covered sectors including manufacturing, energy, mining, fertilizers, food, advanced industries, tourism, agriculture, and pharmaceuticals.

China has become an important trading partner for Jordan. According to remarks by the Chinese ambassador in Amman, bilateral trade exceeded $6.7 billion in 2025, while Chinese investment in Jordan has surpassed $3 billion, according to the Chinese side. Those are significant figures, but they do not by themselves answer the question Amman should be asking: What exactly does Jordan want from its economic relationship with Beijing?

If the answer is more trade, then Jordan already faces a problem in its trade balance. If the answer is attracting investment, then the goal should not simply be projects serving the domestic market. Jordan needs productive investments that can use the country as a base for exporting to other markets.

And if technology is part of the equation, the benchmark should be knowledge transfer, the development of Jordanian companies, and the upgrading of local skills, rather than simply buying Chinese products and services.

Jordan does not need China to replace its principal ally, the United States, nor could it realistically do so. Nor does that appear to be the objective. The relationship with Washington is strategically different, encompassing security, defense, foreign assistance, and political support. Under the current memorandum of understanding, the United States has committed to seeking $1.45 billion a year in bilateral assistance for Jordan from 2023 through 2029.

That partnership is too important to downplay, particularly for a country located in one of the world’s most volatile regions. But foreign assistance, regardless of its size, cannot by itself create a labor market capable of absorbing tens of thousands of new entrants every year. It cannot replace the private sector or generate new Jordanian exports.

All of this, however, requires an equally important parallel track: domestic political reform.

The stability Jordan needs should not be understood simply as the state’s ability to contain security and economic crises. It also depends on its ability to build broader trust between the state and society. That trust cannot be built through economics alone.

Expanding public freedoms, protecting freedom of opinion and expression, creating greater space for independent media, and strengthening the role of civil society are all part of the country’s capacity to withstand the pressures ahead. The economy needs a stable institutional environment. Politics needs a society that feels its voice is heard and that criticism is not treated as a threat to the state.

So, in response to Aaron Magid’s question in Foreign Policy, “Where is King Abdullah?” He is here. And so are Jordan’s institutions. From the Royal Hashemite Court to the government and executive agencies, they are all trying to keep Jordan afloat, much as the country has survived previous periods of far greater turbulence.

The kingdom weathered the Arab Spring while neighboring states were experiencing political and security breakdowns. It then dealt with the consequences of the Syrian war, the refugee crisis, the war against ISIS, energy crises, and the COVID-19 pandemic, before arriving at the current regional war.

The more useful question, then, is not where the king is.

It is whether Jordan can turn its hard-earned stability into something more durable: an economy that creates jobs, a political system that builds public trust, and a foreign policy capable of navigating a region whose risks are no longer temporary shocks, but part of the landscape.