Summary
At first glance, the operation appeared purely military, targeting drug dens. Yet at its core, it was a combined political and security maneuver, through which Amman sent firm and unambiguous messages to the “authorities in control” in As-Suwayda, blocking political projects that had almost turned into a threat to Jordan’s national security.

In what has been described as the most precise and decisive strategic move in years, Jordan redrew the rules of engagement along its northern border with Syria, striking extensively at villages and areas in As-Suwayda in an unprecedented manner.

Preemptive Deterrence
According to analysts, Jordan’s military strikes achieved two key goals: first, neutralizing separatist projects near the border before they could materialize; second, dismantling networks for drug and arms smuggling.

Thus, the message was not merely military but also political, as security specialists and analysts emphasize, especially after chaos in As-Suwayda evolved from an individual threat to an organized institutional danger. What Jordan did not state publicly is that As-Suwayda, under the control of local authority represented by Hikmat al-Hijri, has transformed from a Syrian internal issue into a direct challenge to Jordanian national security.

Jordan avoided direct political accusations but expressed concern over a security vacuum that allowed the development of an organized smuggling economy, using geography as a tool for indirect pressure and extortion. Political analyst Hatem Al-Naimat notes that following strikes by the Jordanian Air Force against smuggling gangs in southern Syria and ISIS in the east, decision-makers finally recognized that merely reacting to developments in Syria is a flawed policy without the constant assertion of action.

Al-Naimat adds, “The Syrian arena is extremely complex, and the new Syrian regime faces deep problems that cannot be solved by appeasing everyone. I expect Jordan has decided to prioritize its interests because it has assessed the absurdity of the Syrian scene. Today, it will not limit itself to border control but will act preemptively, which is a new approach in Jordanian policy, and I believe it is justified given the chaos in our region.”

Why Now?
Historically, Jordan’s engagement with As-Suwayda, only a few kilometers from the Jordanian border, was limited politically. Changes since 2011, influenced by the Syrian war, have altered this dynamic. While As-Suwayda remained one of the less unstable areas, local influence expanded amid the absence of central state authority. In recent years, smuggling across northern Jordanian borders increased, with quasi-independent local networks emerging, turning parts of the province into centers for illicit manufacturing and storage. This reflected the rise of a sustainable, organized smuggling economy.

Observers such as Syrian affairs expert Salah Malkawi note that southern Syria was historically not a drug hub, but the Syrian crisis changed this. As-Suwayda saw expanded cultivation and production of drugs, with smuggling networks moving from border areas into deeper regions. Consequently, smuggling has gradually shifted from Daraa to more complex environments, notably As-Suwayda.

According to Malkawi, threats from Jordan’s northern border are no longer limited to isolated infiltration or smuggling attempts but have become organized cross-border networks, requiring action beyond traditional law enforcement, targeting the smuggling infrastructure itself.

In recent days, the Jordanian Armed Forces executed precise military operations against factories and facilities used as dens for weapons and drug traffickers along the northern border, sending an unprecedented message in terms of target nature and escalation level. This indicates that the issue is no longer isolated crime but an entire threat infrastructure, justifying the full involvement of the Jordanian army rather than conventional security measures.

Geographical analysis of smuggling routes targeted by Jordan identifies As-Suwayda as the most sensitive launch point, given its security weakness, which allowed organized smuggling networks to operate with relative impunity. Targeting factories rather than individual smugglers reinforces the notion that parts of southern Syria, including As-Suwayda and its surroundings, have become operational hubs for organized smuggling amid the absence of effective local authority.

The Authority in Place
Central to this context is Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri, regarded as the most influential spiritual and social figure in As-Suwayda. While Jordan has not issued formal accusations against him or his circle, observers note that those who hold influence but fail to prevent their area from becoming a cross-border threat effectively become part of the problem.

Observers indicate that Jordan’s targeting of smuggling infrastructure along the border, in coordination with regional partners, demonstrates it will not wait for uncertain or delayed Syrian internal solutions. This is confirmed by official Jordanian military statements, the nature of the targets, and a clear shift in Jordanian security doctrine from merely preventing smuggling attempts to targeting the smuggling infrastructure deep within the border region.

Sources close to the Jordanian government report that drugs have become an alternative income source in As-Suwayda and that conflicts within the province are no longer just political but also economic, revolving around smuggling routes and protection. The Jordanian army faced organized armed groups using advanced logistics, representing networks with local protection and regional influence rather than isolated individuals.

Military analyst Nidal Abu Zeid confirms that Jordan’s operation in As-Suwayda was coordinated with the new Syrian authorities, signaling Jordan’s rejection of separatist attempts, which it views as a threat to its security and sovereignty. Abu Zeid noted that one of the largest drug and arms traffickers to Jordan, Imad Oloum, was targeted, stressing that the operation’s targets were legitimate and did not include civilians.

He added that this was not the first Jordanian air operation; in May of this year, a similar strike occurred in the same area, and in 2024 another operation successfully reached a major trafficker. An important factor legitimizing Jordanian military intervention in Syrian territory is the 2024 Amman pentad for neighboring states, which established a joint Jordanian-Syrian-Iraqi-Turkish operations room, allowing Jordan to intervene whenever threats arose near its borders.